In the three years since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European NATO states have rushed to embark upon rearmament programs. However, thus far existing investments have achieved little in the way of meaningful deployable capabilities and emphasized building or rebuilding exquisite heavy and high-end capabilities over relatively long time horizons. [1] The current pace of rearmament efforts is likely to create significant capability gaps for NATO in light of probable American retrenchment and a greater emphasis placed in Washington on commitments in the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere. [2]
Intelligence from NATO states suggests that Russia is poised to reconstitute its forces to threaten NATO's eastern flank as early as the end of this decade. [3] Paradoxically, lynchpin European militaries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France are only on pace to be capable of collectively fielding a small number of piecemeal deployable brigades or token understrength divisions. Considering the significant near and mid-term threats to NATO's eastern flank, I argue that European NATO member states must embrace a mobilization mentality to reduce dependence on American enablers, rapidly produce fieldable systems and deployable ground units at a rate "too much and too soon," as Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the U.S. War Production Board during World War II, put it. [4]
"We live in a more dangerous world" – NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte 2025 [5]
Upon a conclusion to Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, European NATO states would have a short timetable to rearm for an allied defence of the Baltic region sufficiently. At current production rates, an IISS report from earlier this year estimated "Russia could field around 3,300 MBTs, 11,000 APCs, IFVs and airborne combat vehicles; 2,000 self-propelled artillery pieces; and 1,300 multiple rocket launchers" by 2027, assuming a ceasefire was achieved in Ukraine by mid-2025. [6] To realize existing plans for a defence against Russia, NATO member states would need to field between 35 and 50 additional brigades with a goal reportedly for a total of "between 120 and 130 brigades." [7]
The United Kingdom, Germany, and France, states that would be called upon to play an outsized role in allied defence, have to date failed to match their significant stated commitments with proximate improvements in readiness, fieldable units, or reserves. The British Army's sole warfighting division (the 3rd (UK) Division) primarily exists on paper. As of February 2025, the Bundeswehr's readiness had actually dropped from its already poor state at the start of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite the much-heralded Zeitenwende. [8] France, while undertaking substantial budgetary and industrial base measures, is aiming to be capable of deploying a 2-brigade division within 30 days by 2027. [9] Even this modest goal is indicative of the gap between existing commitments and current realities.
Meanwhile, multinational NATO battlegroups deployed in the Baltics remain principally symbolic tripwire forces. These multinational contingents may serve signaling functions, but they lack the stomping power to deter or repel a Russian assault. NATO's eastern flank is unlikely to reassure allies or deter adversaries unless backed by real capability. [10] In short, NATO Europe must pivot from symbolic presence to tangible, scaled capabilities. Should the Alliance continue on its current trajectory, it risks presenting Russia with an exploitable window in the late 2020s and early 2030s, at a time when U.S. attention and resources are likely to be drawn away from Europe to the western hemisphere and Indo-Pacific. [11]
Don't Let 2030 Be Like 1870
The Franco-Prussian War is an illustrative example of the consequences of failing to prepare for potential conflict adequately. In the late 1860s, Emperor Napoleon III and Marshal Adolphe Niel recognized that France's relatively small professional army was insufficient to meet Prussia's rapidly expanding force. Due to the political unfeasibility of universal conscription, Niel sought to both reorganize French railways and create a large trained strategic reserve, the Garde Mobile, which could be called upon in wartime. On paper, this gave France hundreds of thousands of additional troops. In practice, however, political resistance in the legislature, budget cuts, and reticence in the army, along with Niel's untimely death, disrupted the reforms. When war came in 1870, France faced a catastrophic defeat at the hands of a combined Prussian-German army. [12]
In European capitals today, defence ministries and cabinets speak of rebuilding their armed forces and defence industrial bases, but often still resist making fiscally difficult choices, establishing viable reserve infrastructure, and mobilizing their societies sufficiently. Absent a course correction, European NATO member states are at risk of squandering large sums of funds on paper armies that exist as administrative units but fail to materialize. The fate of France in 1870 demonstrates that time lost in parliamentary committees or bureaucratic squabbles often cannot be made up for once a conflict begins.
The Problem of Long Timelines and Enablers
One of the most serious weaknesses in European NATO rearmament is its dependence on initiatives with lengthy development cycles. The Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), and the Tempest fighter are all centered around platforms that will not be fielded until the 2030s at the earliest. [13] Germany's wide-ranging €350 billion procurement plan announced this year will stretch on until 2041. [14] Although big-ticket initiatives may eventually yield large numbers of highly capable, sophisticated platforms, a lack of prioritization on delivering capabilities in the near term could prove catastrophic.
Equally problematic is Europe's over-reliance on hard-to-replace U.S. enablers. Command and control, ISR, strategic airlift, SIGINT, electronic warfare, and missile defense capabilities are highly dependent on U.S. assets. Although progress has been made in some areas, namely through the European Sky Shield Initiative and the European Air Transport Command (EATC) Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet, a comprehensive plan to reduce reliance on U.S. enablers within 10 years should be developed. Due to high costs and existing efforts at the NATO and EU levels, joint acquisition initiatives would be a useful tool to build capabilities quickly. [15] Leveraging low-cost debt vehicles akin to Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a €150 billion programme designed to facilitate defence industrial base investment and "common procurements" within the European Union and with partners, particularly the United Kingdom, presents a path to finance the procurement of enablers that are expensive both monetarily and in terms of physical capital. [16]
Building New Formations for the Modern Battlefield
If European NATO states are to field sufficient forces to deter or, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression, they must prioritize mass-producible, rapidly fieldable systems to help fill equipment gaps and increase the number of deployable units, even if pragmatic compromises in platforms procured or force structure may be necessary. The U.S. M3 Lee medium tank (Grant in Commonwealth service) from World War II is a good historical example of this principle. Although it had an awkward design featuring a high profile and two main guns, its mobility and ability to be mass-produced while American industry was retooling for war production made it invaluable for the buildup of American armored units and, via Lend-Lease, the Allied war effort in North Africa. [17] Today, Europe should embrace similarly pragmatic solutions. Vehicles in the vein of the Plasan Sandcat and General Motors Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), built on commercial 4x4 truck chassis, can provide capability at scale across a variety of roles to existing and new formations. [18] By leveraging existing automotive production lines, Europe could produce thousands of light troop and missile carriers in a short timeframe.
The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate that survivable maneuver increasingly lends itself to agile, lower signature units capable of leveraging technology to expand situational awareness and compress kill chains in an electronic warfare heavy environment. In Ukraine, the majority of casualties today are caused by one-way attack drones, and maneuver is hampered by battlefield transparency that makes large-scale concentrated mechanized assaults highly costly. [19]
In response to vulnerabilities revealed over the course of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Army has begun restructuring its light infantry brigades and field-testing new concepts and capabilities through the "Transforming in Contact" initiative. The goal is to make these units, designated as Mobile Brigade Combat Teams, lighter, more mobile, lower in signature, but higher in organic firepower, with integrated electronic warfare and counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capabilities, and large numbers of drones embedded from the brigade down to the platoon level. The 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, the first unit restructured as an MBCT, demonstrates the viability of this approach. ISV vehicles provide infantry units with greater mobility while "Strike companies" within each battalion are armed with drones, counter-UAS, and electronic warfare assets, extending each brigade's reach, situational awareness, and combat power. [20]
Britain's Project ASGARD, a "digital targeting web" field-tested in Estonia, offers another example of how European NATO militaries can leverage new technologies to compress kill chains and improve the effectiveness of mobile, lighter footprint formations. ASGARD, which aims to build an accelerated reconnaissance strike complex, is a good demonstration of how software innovations, AI-enabled reconnaissance tools, loitering munitions, and long-range fires can be leveraged at greater speed, effect, and intensity. [21] Embracing these lighter, more agile unit structures provides a pathway for European NATO militaries to rapidly field deployable formations in a far shorter timeframe than primarily emphasizing heavier armored and mechanized capabilities with much longer equipment delivery timelines.
Conclusion: Too Much Too Soon or Too Little Too Late
European NATO members stand at a critical juncture. Intelligence and current production levels suggest that Russia could rebuild its offensive capabilities to threaten NATO's Eastern flank in relatively short order following a conclusion to its war against Ukraine. The European pillar of the Alliance may have less than a decade to build forces with sufficient military strength to deter and, if necessary, confront Russian aggression at a time when attention in Washington is focused elsewhere. By taking collective measures to reduce reliance on U.S. enablers, procuring vehicles derived from commercial designs, and building smart, lower footprint, yet higher firepower formations, leading European NATO armies such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France can field more deployable brigades in a shorter timeframe than existing plans. Although these lighter formations cannot fully replace heavier formations, lighter deployable brigades are superior to those that exist primarily on the drawing board. Time is of the essence. If the leading states within the European leg of the Alliance fail to prioritize fielding units in a more viable timeframe, NATO may be left with too little, too late.
References
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