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On the first day of my second deployment to Afghanistan in 2020, I found myself intently watching the screens in the Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) of the Kabul Security Force (KSF). Unfolding in front our eyes was one of the bloodiest and most barbaric terrorist attacks in recent years, carried out by Islamic State – Khorasan Province, commonly known as ISIS-K. Footage from our surveillance drones circling overhead displayed a live feed of the Médecins Sans Frontières maternity ward in central Kabul, smoke billowing from several windows and a destroyed suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (IED) smouldering against its entrance. Through multiple channels, we listened as gunfire and explosions permeated through the city. With units already on the ground conducting routine patrols, our Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rapidly rolled out of the gate ready to form a cordon to secure the area for Afghanistan’s special forces to clear the compound. The CJOC was alive with activity and, whilst I hurriedly called every embassy in the area to account for their people, I watched as the building was cleared of the ISIS-K terrorists. The reports and the photos came back; they had systematically gone room to room murdering pre- and post-natal fifteen mothers and, in two cases, their newborn babies; and had killed of twenty-four innocent people, some in the dawning of their beautiful lives.
Although the events of that day have stuck with me ever since, I have reflected on how different that was to my first tour, in Helmand Province, 6 years prior. Whilst the Taliban remained a threat, the character of our operations had changed. We were in the middle of COVID-19 and routinely watched the locals digging mass graves as the residents of Kabul made a painful decision: quarantine and starve; or go out to work and catch an illness that, at its height, would go on to claim the lives of over 80,000 people a week worldwide. In Helmand, whilst patrolling, instead we watched for IEDs through ground sign such as a pile of pebbles, and we avoided known ambush areas. Characteristically, they were almost entirely different. In that moment, it was obvious to me that the character of war does, indeed, change; but its nature endures.
Conflict is not a static technical problem; it is a contest against a living opponent. Defence Tech Founders must routinely consider both the nature and the character of war when developing their innovation, otherwise they are doomed to failure.
The Character of War Changes; Its Nature Endures
War is brutal, violent and chaotic - it is an almost entirely human endeavour. Although reports have emerged of a successful fully autonomous Ukrainian attack on a Russian position, humans were involved in some way. As one Australian General surmised: ‘would you rather I threaten your autonomous systems with mine or punch you in the face’. The latter is, of course, more threatening. Whether we like it or not, the nature of war remains constant. As Clausewitz, the 19th Century military theorist, said, war is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”. And war is becoming more prevalent: the Center for Preventative Action’s Global Conflict Tracker records 28 ongoing conflicts worldwide.
In contrast, its character is always changing. “Shaped by the pace and extent of technological, economic, societal and cultural change”, 4000 years’ worth of history tells us that innovation drives the pace of change. As one capability is developed, a counter-capability is identified. And so spiral development exists to overcome our adversaries. This is what Founders tend to fixate on, and understandably: there is money to be made from developing a capability that can outperform the enemy’s. According to the NATO Innovation Fund and Dealroom, European defence, security and resilience startups raised a record $8.7bn in 2025, with the UK leading Europe by attracting $2.9bn in 2025 and $9.9bn since 2020.
Many dual-use innovators understand the changing surface of conflict better than its enduring logic, but the strongest companies are those that build for both. Because war is political, and how Defence spends its money for the current threat is driven largely by politics.
Lesson One: Novelty is Not the Same as Relevance
The character of conflict changes quickly, but technology only matters if it solves an enduring problem such as uncertainty, survivability, tempo, deception, resilience, or sustainment.
In military strategy, we talk of ‘Ends’, ‘Ways’, and ‘Means’. The ‘Ends’ are what we are trying to achieve - where we are trying to get to. The ‘Ways’ is the route we are planning to take. The ‘Means’: our vehicle in which we will get there. AI, autonomy, cyber, sensing and space are expressions of the changing character of conflict, but they do not necessarily equate to the ‘Ends’. In NATO countries, novelty does not tend to sway the military buyer; defence customers buy operational advantage under pressure.
I meet countless founders who claim to have found the solution to a question that has not been asked. Lord Robertson, the principal author of the 2025 Strategic Defence Review and former NATO chief, recently criticised the Prime Minister of “corrosive complacency” over the UK’s £28bn black hole in Defence. This may reflect overstretch rather than insufficient budget: the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is consistently having to prioritise its programmatic spending. Not everything can be fixed at once; not everything can be bought immediately.
For founders, this can be frustrating. Their runway is short; they require a purchase order or some clear demand signal to secure funding; their lights may only be a few weeks from turning off and they may have left their comfortable jobs to pursue this dream. In some cases, I have seen whole pensions invested into these ventures. A founder must ask themselves, ‘is this the right time?’ Those most experienced in business know they must diversify to survive and dual-use has become the accepted way to achieve that. Some of the companies I have worked with have hedged that risk by prioritising their civil capability first to give them the longevity needed to survive Defence’s ‘valley of death’. The war in Ukraine will end, as will the war in Iran - they are unsustainable. The UK has no requirement to store tens of thousands of one-way effectors in preparation for a war that may not come, and may look entirely different to ones we see now.
This is not to dissuade the innovator. In fact, deterrence is our only hope and innovation will drive that if we can innovate quicker than our adversaries. But, in some instances, just because someone in uniform has said that a particular technology is the answer, does not mean it is the answer right now.
Founders must hedge their bets and choose when to enter the Defence market - it is slow, bureaucratic, and has one true customer - if the customer is currently Ukraine, what happens when that war ends?
Lesson Two: The Enemy is Not a User Case; the Enemy Adapts
The enemy always gets a vote. Conflict is interactive: adversaries jam, spoof, deceive, saturate, bypass, and learn. A capability built only for test conditions will struggle once the opponent begins to respond.
Despite being the current zeitgeist, innovation is not new. Consider the development of the rifle. In the 19th Century, Britain, as the world’s superpower, had to consistently update its weapon systems to counter its enemies’ capabilities. At the turn of the century, most armies relied on smoothbore muskets with flintlock ignition. They were soon replaced to percussion ignition as they were more reliable, especially in poor weather, and they made firearms quicker and simpler to operate. Soon came the Minié system, with its hollow based bullet that expanded on firing, gripping the rifling when fired, allowing for quicker reloading and dramatically improving range and accuracy compared to smoothbores. Later, single-shot breech-loaders were replaced by repeating rifles with magazines that held multiple rounds. By the end of the century, the general pattern of the modern military rifle had emerged: bolt-action, breech-loading, magazine-fed, using metallic cartridges and smokeless powder.
The difference now, driven by the changing character of war, is that innovation happens much quicker - the Ukraine war has created ultra-fast, bottom-up innovation cycles as short as four to six weeks; some would argue it is happening even quicker. This is both an opportunity and a threat: if a start-up can remain agile and build a capability that is easily iterated, has modularity, and can operate in the most contested environments, then they have a chance.
Defence relies heavily on reputation, and a brand can be badly damaged with a product that fails in a contested environment. A good demo proves a concept; an adaptive product survives contact with an enemy.
Lesson Three: The Real Edge is People Who Understand Both Worlds
Deep-tech is inherently expensive. Whilst Defence spending is increasing, the opportunity for that spend to go towards innovative capabilities is less than some may think. Budgets are split into RDEL (Resource Departmental Expenditure Limit) and CDEL (Capital Departmental Expenditure Limit). RDEL covers the day-to-day running costs of a department - in the MOD, this is approximately £47.4bn. CDEL, primarily used for procurement, is around £23.1bn, the bulk of which goes towards major programmes and Through Life Support (TLS) of current capabilities. A small pot of that goes towards innovation. Being able to translate the programme of record into real capability requirements takes experience and foresight. If a capability is vehicle mounted, what vehicle is it mounted to? How does it integrate into the £2.8bn Boxer programme? What conversations need to happen - is it driven by the prime or is it demanded by the MOD?
Dual-use innovation succeeds when technical ingenuity is fused with operational understanding. Teams need people who know what use, risk, compromise, and mission effect look like in practice, and how that translates into a business case. If a return on investment, often translated into lethality or survivability, is not clear, it will not make it into the Annual Budgetary Cycle (ABC); and if there are doubts, it will not survive the annual Balance of Investment (BOI). This is not a criticism, it is a fact: Defence may not be ready for an innovation right now, even if it knows it needs it. Does it prioritise the retrofitting of their current sunset capabilities with an innovation, or does it prioritise replacing that capability through a major programme, an undoubtedly more costly commitment? In some cases, yes; but innovators need to have those conversations to ensure they can open the right doors.
At some point, the issue stops being whether a startup can build advanced technology. The issue becomes whether it understands the world into which that technology will be introduced. When innovators understand both worlds and can speak the language, it opens doors. Some of the best founding teams I have met include those from uniformed service: the innovation comes from the innovator; the realism comes from the veteran standing next to them.
Whilst not universal, experience is often a strategic asset - the founder just has to find the right experience. There are thousands of service leavers entering into the civil sector every day, but they tend to still be driven by mission and purpose; ask for a chat, offer them a coffee, run some ideas by them. And certainly find a strategic advisor. It is not that they know more - it is that they may know different.
Final Epiphany
Watching the War in Iran unfold, I experienced an epiphany - had innovation advanced to this level when we were in Afghanistan, would we have worked in the same way? Almost certainly, no. During my first tour, ISAF operated out of Patrol Bases (PBs) and large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) - Camp Bastion, which we operated out of as a ground-holding protected mobility company, was the size of Reading and housed up to 30,000 international servicemen and women. The perfect target for regular drone strikes. We would have had to disperse and find ways to counter that technology.
Whilst operations covered nearly a 20-year period, the nature of the conflict was still violent: there were 3,621 coalition deaths in Afghanistan. Yet its character changed regularly, from the maturity of IEDs to the responding counter-IED measures; and to those who took part and the principles that inspired them like ISIS-K and their unwavering intent to spread terror through the country.
Some of the greatest value available to defence tech companies may not sit only in code, capital, or concept notes; it may be in people. Defence is not like any other industry: it has its own language; its own insular tribes; its own 350-year history; its own securely locked front door. Translation and realism are the key, and sometimes, that is held by those who have worked face-to-face with conflict’s enduring, brutal realities.
References:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2025) ‘Ever-faster weapon cycles: innovation and economics in the war in Ukraine’, The Strategist, 16 September. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ever-faster-weapon-cycles-innovation-and-economics-in-the-war-in-ukraine/.
Center for Preventive Action (n.d.) Global Conflict Tracker. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker.
Clausewitz, C. von (1989) On War. Edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Available at: https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/EWS%20On%20War%20Reading%20Book%201%20Ch%201%20Ch%202.pdf .
Doctors Without Borders (2021) ‘Afghanistan: One year after the massacre in a maternity ward’, Doctors Without Borders, 10 May. Available at: https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/afghanistan-massacre-maternity-ward.
HM Treasury (2025) Public Spending Statistics: July 2025. London: HM Treasury. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/public-spending-statistics-release-july-2025/public-spending-statistics-july-2025.
Ministry of Defence (2022) Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: UK Defence Doctrine. 6th edn. London: Ministry of Defence. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63776f4de90e0728553b568b/UK_Defence_Doctrine_Ed6.pdf.
NATO Innovation Fund (2026) ‘Dealroom and NATO Innovation Fund: European Defence, Security & Resilience startups smash record with $8.7B raised in 2025’, NATO Innovation Fund, 10 February. Available at: https://www.nif.fund/news/dealroom-and-nato-innovation-fund-european-defence-security-resilience-startups-smash-record-with-8-7b-raised-in-2025/.
The Guardian (2026) ‘The Guardian view on defence spending: should the UK’s security rest with Donald Trump?’, The Guardian, 14 April. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/apr/14/the-guardian-view-on-defence-spending-should-uk-security-rest-with-donald-trump.
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